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Moral Hypocrisy, Power and Social Preferences

Rustichini, Aldo; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2012

the fairness and unfairness of allocations in three different scenarios (a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game, and a Trust … same session we elicit again their principles regarding the fairness and unfairness of allocations in the same three … norm in its favor and the weak side agrees : Stated fairness is a compromise with power. Second, in most situations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858029

Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858030

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056862

College Admissions in China : A Mechanism Design Perspective

Zhu, Min - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

This paper justifies the evolution of the college admissions system in China from a mechanism design perspective. The sequential choice algorithm and the parallel choice algorithm used in the context of China’s college admissions system are formulated as the well-studied Boston mechanism and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692881

Mixing the Carrots with the Sticks : Third Party Punishment and Reward

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Mitchell, Helen - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013

While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many instances in daily life, in most laboratory studies, the demand for punishment and reward are studied separately from one another. This paper presents the results from an experiment measuring the demand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858020

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037

The Dark Side of Competition for Status

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161035

Inequity and Risk Aversion in Sequential Public Good Games

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2009

This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent's behavior in a sequential public good game depending on whether the agent is first or second mover. Theoretical predictions are based on heterogeneity of individuals in terms of social and risk preferences. We modelize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490699

Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive : Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2010

In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460678

Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007

In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029818