Showing 1 - 10 of 12
L'objet de cet article est de mesurer le pouvoir des membres des conseils d'administration des universités françaises tel qu'il est défini par la loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités (loi LRU). A l'aide d'outils issus de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, et en...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790945
La loi LRU (loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités) change la structure du pouvoir au sein des universités françaises. Seuls les membres du conseil d'administration prennent part à l'élection du président, alors qu'auparavant, les membres du conseil scien- tifique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791986
A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899396
According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899930
Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618137
Since 1992, the international community is trying to arrive at a multilateral agreement on the reduction of emissions for greenhouse gases. A collective decision mechanism was adopted in 1997: An agreement is ratified if and only if it is approved by a coalition gathering more than 55 countries....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788999
This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008789421
When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790976
Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting gamehave on a binary issue independent opinions, they may haveinterest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gainof influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usualindependence of votes, we first study the alliance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008792435
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to exhibit the impacts of lease duration and lease break options on the optimal holding period for a real estate asset or portfolio Methodology / approach We use a Monte Carlo simulation framework to simulate a real estate assets cash-flows in which lease...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933143