$-additivity, we define the so-called $k$-balanced games and the corresponding generalization of core, the $k$-additive core, whose …,$ so that the corresponding $k$-additive core is not empty. For the games in the $k$-additive core, we propose a sharing …In this paper we present a generalization of the concept of balanced game for finite games. Balanced games are those …

define to so-called k-balanced games and the corresponding generalization of core, the k-additive core, whose elements are … corresponding k-additive core is not empty. For the games in the k-additive core, we propose a sharing procedure to get an …In this paper, we present a generalization of the concept of balanced game for finite games. Balanced games are those …

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the … coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be used. An interesting case is when possible coalitions are defined … core, reflecting the team structure, and previous attempts are not satisfactory in this respect. We propose a new notion of …

graphs. We study in this perspective the core of games defined on k-regular set systems. We show that the core may be … on the set of players, etc. There are already many works dealing with games on restricted set of coalitions, defining …

-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibrium of two games, where in the first …The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the … context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical …

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … the minimum bargaining set naturally reduces to the core for balanced games. We study this set, giving properties and …

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the … to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration …, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In …

definition includes as a particular case the classical definition of pure exchange economy. We adapt the core concept to a … coalitional exchange economy, and we show the non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we discuss more general setting where individual …

finding the core of such games, i.e., theset of additive dominating games. …Bicooperative games generalize classical cooperative games in the sense that a player is allowed to play in favor or … against some aim, besides non participation. Bicapacities are monotonic bicooperative games, they are useful in decision …

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the … coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be used. An interesting case is when possible coalitions are defined …, one or several players with all their subordinates. In these situations, the core in its usual formulation may be …