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Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2009

close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738542

Strategic communication networks

Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2008

this coordination game with heterogeneous preferences is played, a cheap talk communication stage is offered to players who … coordination motive and the prior information structure. Equilibrium strategic communication networks are characterized in a very …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930223

Strategic communication networks

Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frédéric - HAL - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025532

Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments

Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2010

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790708

A TEST OF CHEAP TALK IN DIFFERENT HYPOTHETICAL CONTEXTS: THE CASE OF AIR POLLUTION

Ami, Dominique; Aprahamian, Frédéric; Chanel, Olivier; … - HAL - 2009

We explore the influence of a neutral cheap talk script in three typical scenarios used in the CV literature devoted to the valuation of air pollution effects. We show that cheap talk has a differentiated effect depending on the scenario implemented. It decreases protest responses with no effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793873

Learning Benevolent Leadership in a Heterogenous Agents Economy

Arifovic, Jasmina; Dawid, Herbert; Deissenberg, Christophe - HAL - 2008

This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talkinflation announcements in an agent-based dynamic extension of theKydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makesa non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actualinflation rate. It updates its decisions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794261

Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments

Casella, Alessandra - HAL - 2008

The paper studies a voting scheme where members of a committee voting sequentially on a known series of binary proposals are each granted a single extra bonus vote to cast as desired - a streamlined version of Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a simple sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794774

Coordination au sein d'une économie simplifiée : l'économie évolutionnaire des cacahuètes tabou

Piatecki, Cyrille - HAL - 2014

Le problème de la coordination décentralisée des comportements individuels et de l'ajustement de l'économie vers un … présent article étudie les capacités de coordination d'une économie stylisée au travers d'une dynamique évolutionnaire d …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821257

Eductive stability in real business cycle models

Evans, George W.; Guesnerie, Roger; Mcgough, Bruce - HAL - 2010

We re-examine issues of coordination in the standard RBC model. Can the unique rational expectations equilibrium be … coordination along this line cannot be expected. Rational agents anticipating small but possibly persistent deviations have to face …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738777

General equilibrium, coordination and multiplicity on spot markets

Guesnerie, Roger - HAL - 2006

-oct 2002. The text reviews recent work on expectational coordination in general equilibrium models of the Walrasian tradition … "eductive learning". It examines in a more systematic way the coordination difficulties that would arise in finite horizon … models with spot multiplicity and discusses the relationship between coordination and incompleteness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738822