the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find …This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative performance feedback policies … on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: No feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through …

matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As … already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co … tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co-participant, increases women's willingness …

in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into … enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is …

such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a … tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than …

to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether …. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether …. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a … tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than …

evidence on their influence on quitting decisions. This paper presents results from an experiment in which participants receive … precise feedback on the co-worker's output, and also vary whether the two workers can communicate. We find that allowing …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …