pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without …

) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment … exclusion from the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocity establishes bribery relationships, where …

We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another …. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and …

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can …-interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness. …

Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most … controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness … intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal …

exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players’ fairness …

systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and … insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of …

’ payoffs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether players (a) learn the game they are playing, (b) learn to predict …

We conduct a laboratory experiment where third-party spectators can redistribute resources between two agents, thereby … inequalities, but many follow an interior allocation rule previously unaccounted for by the fairness views in the literature. These …

-social acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that third parties punish reluctantly: they state a preference to punish, but …