Showing 1 - 10 of 28
shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959767
This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822774
managers and thus possibly making China’s listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem. As such, ownership …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566733
takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on … work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279348
Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the "psychology and economics" of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008469709
In this paper we present and test a theory of how political corruption, found in many transition and emerging market economies, affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884312
ownership and supervisory board size, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with ownership by managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103255
On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompeting explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762239
. Third, and most importantly, making shareholders the ultimate owner of the firm provides the best possible diversification …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822066
large firms. In this paper, we analyze shareholders as agents that can both harm and benefit companies. We examine the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822452