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Identity Changes and the Efficiency of Reputation Systems

Wibral, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users …. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can … therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884234

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727782

Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761666

Incentives, Decision Frames, and Motivation Crowding Out - An Experimental Investigation

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948

Why Volunteer? Evidence on the Role of Altruism, Reputation, and Incentives

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Myers, Caitlin Knowles - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

Volunteering plays a prominent role in the charitable provision of goods and services, yet we know relatively little about why people engage in such prosocial acts. The list of possible motivations is long, but recent research has focused on altruism, reputational concerns, and material...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762134

On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity

Fehr, Ernst; Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by … interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822329

On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations

Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

this task. We show, that those announced beliefs lead to a self fulfilling prophecy as the reputation of the responsible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822649

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543256

Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Peyrache, Eloïc - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700845