Showing 1 - 10 of 140
Attorneys elected to the US Congress and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law than legislators with a different professional background. This finding is based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011195828
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959704
We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822598
Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703268
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703639
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233818
We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce large but unequally distributed welfare gains and elections through which the poor majority can redistribute income away from the rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their income by trading in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527327
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature … associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one … between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233874
of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on low …-tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful …% of societies with finitely-repeated encounters. However, lobbying investments are not always profitable, and profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008742954
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and … theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566608