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incentives as well as the puzzling incompleteness of many economic contracts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762323
Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822552
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principalagent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822988
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703546
, bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality, trust, and positive reciprocity. Three dimensions of religiosity are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701329
We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and bonus pay – affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763505
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences … rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterized by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822329
When unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements – or relational contracts – also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703067
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762122
Among economists, there is increased recognition of the role individuals’ identities play in decision-making. In this paper, we conduct laboratory experiments in which we explore the motivations for and the effects of group identity. We find that negative out-group opinion (acting as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762312