We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southernfirms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their intrinsiccosts and their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectualproperty rights. We find...

We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over time.In our framework, entrants have to incur sunk costs in order to enter a market. After becomingincumbents, they disregard these entry costs in deciding whether to continue operating or to...

This paper describes major external changes to the U.S. public agricultural researchsystem over 1988-1999; describes the reactions of the public agricultural research system to theexternal changes, specifying the innovations that have occurred over the last decade; and drawsconclusions about the present...

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and several heterogeneousSouthern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume the southern firms differ intheir ability to adapt technology and use this heterogeneity to study the differing incentives ofsouthern governments to...

This paper examines the impact of public and private agricultural research andextension on agricultural total factor productivity at the state level. We test the hypothesis thatthe composition of agricultural experiment station funding—share of funding from impact offederal competitive grants...