Showing 1 - 10 of 76
When considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict the amount of post-conflict … leakage due to infiltration by members of losing groups. We use this insight to explain why conflict often takes place along … ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more often in conflict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126000
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746186
A fundamental issue for economists is what determines civil conflict. One unsettled question is the relative importance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928706
static models of the effect of income on the extensive margin of conflict. Civil conflicts are shown to be persistent, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126240
This paper rethinks audit regimes from the shadow-land of outsourcing in India. This is the arena of informalized work environments that are connected to global value chains and the revenue streams of an extractive liberalization state focused on public debt repayment. Based on ethnography of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126585
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071363
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071455
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928636
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744973
This paper develops a simple model to show how social insurance affects the desire to revolt against property rights. It then tests for the effect of social insurance on revolt by introducing a panel data set derived from surveys across 200,000 randomly sampled individuals from the 1970s to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745808