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Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2015

-assessments can be detrimental to workers’ performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199813

Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs

Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667906

Goals (th)at Work – Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance

Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work … backed up by monetary incentives. We propose a novel incentive contract where – through the choice of a personal work goal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010584376

Wage Differentials, Fairness, and Social Comparison: An experimental study of the Co-Employment of Permanent and Temporary Agency Workers†

Alewell, Dorothea; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

employees. For our experiment, we use an institutional design of wage negotiations among employers, employees and temporary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633213

Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US

Fischer, Sven; Goerg, Sebastian; Hamann, Hanjo - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

slightly inhibits it instead. Our experiment thus illustrates the paramount importance of taking into account both incentives … states and in British Columbia, Canada. We ran a laboratory experiment with a framing likened to German corporate law which … overcome material incentives. However, even absent incentives the stakeholder norm does not foster other regarding behavior but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662709

Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Beckenkamp, Martin; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2007

We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005272723

Oligopoly as a Socially Embedded Dilemma. An Experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689

Words Substitute Fists – Justifying Punishment in a Public Good Experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963

Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491

Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Ro'i Zultan - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106492