Showing 1 - 10 of 20
This article shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less than full compensation. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability but also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556294
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689
We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021692
controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does … authority’s decision affecting herself, not affecting others. In the Public treatment, all reasons are made public. Whenever …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963
states and in British Columbia, Canada. We ran a laboratory experiment with a framing likened to German corporate law which … slightly inhibits it instead. Our experiment thus illustrates the paramount importance of taking into account both incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662709
According to Adam Smith (1790), human selfishness can be restrained by introspection. We test the effect of introspection on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Drawing on the concept of identity utility (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000), we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194285
We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106492
aversion to inequity is sufficiently strong, even individuals with high ability may support redistribution. In a lab experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895278
Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535930