While much is known about optimal design of auctions within the context of a single item for sale, little is known about optimal design of large platform markets like eBay and auto auction houses that house large numbers of concurrent auctions. We attempt a macro-level empirical market design...

Although we have many tools to understand the effect of regulation on competition, we know little about the importance of enforcement in explaining the impact of regulation. For this purpose, this paper uses data from Spanish local television industry in Spain from 1995 through 2001, which...

Inspired by the ongoing debate regarding the liberalization of the Spanish railway network, we use real-world information on the features of passenger transportation demand and the existing network infrastructure to build a complex experimental setting. We test the efficiency of alternative...

In Portugal, the telecommunications incumbent o®ers broadband access to the Inter- net, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. In this article, we estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. We use a panel of...

We present experimental results from a series of sessions organized using the Power Market simulator; a software designed to realistically replicate the Spanish Electricity Market. In the experiments reported here we compare the status quo to two alternative treatments which represent...

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history in a situation where firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings complements or substitutes. By addressing this new type of behavior-based price...

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome may prevail independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A lighthanded regulatory policy can...