Showing 1 - 10 of 91
Governments often contract with private firms to provide public services such as health care and education. To decrease …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461681
This paper illustrates how one can use causal effects of a policy change to measure its welfare impact without decomposing them into income and substitution effects. Often, a single causal effect suffices: the impact on government revenue. Because these responses vary with the policy in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459485
This report summarises and analyses Kenya’s social policy response to Covid-19. Following the global outbreak of the pandemic, Kenya’s parliament passed several economic and social laws. Tax law amendments aimed to cushion citizens and businesses from the negative effects of the disease by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013286460
Nearly all prior work on government outsourcing has focused on the contracting firm's incentives. This paper shows how strong incentive contracts may be insufficient to generate spending reductions (or other desired outcomes) in the presence of a binding technological or managerial constraint....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362044
How far do the contractual implications of hold-up-based theories (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979, 1985)) extend? I investigate this in the context of trucking. Quasi-rents in trucking are generally smaller than in the contexts studied in the previous empirical literature....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471437
-term contracts. We argue that only if the parties to a unitization contract have unit production shares that are the same as their … cost shares will the contract be incentive compatible. Using a data base of sixty unit operating agreements, we measure the … desirable contract rules for avoiding moral hazard. It also shows how the effects of those rules can be replicated in difficult …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471652
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477157
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271
efficiency is not attainable. We show that contracts involving mutual control might sometimes be superior to the best contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478394
This paper examines the sharing of risk under three different remedies for breach of contract. The risk considered …. By means of a numerical example, it is shown that use of the prevailing remedy for breach of contract -- the expectation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478401