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Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests

Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957

Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188

Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change

Angeletos, George-Marios - 2004

Global games of regime change -- that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it -- have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467670

Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research

Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010

Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

Grossman, Sanford J. - 1986

We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477163

Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices

Eyster, Erik - 2015

We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457443

Information-Constrained Coordination of Economic Behavior

Aridor, Guy; Silveira, Rava Azeredo da; Woodford, Michael - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

compressed representation of the game's payoffs in a particular case, where the compressed representation is a latent state … players' action probabilities with changes in the game payoffs, and the dependence of the degree of stochasticity of players …' choices on the range of game payoffs encountered on different trials. Our approach also provides an account of the way in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486205

Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy

Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito's government launching a war against the United States, or Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250204

Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Receiver's equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the presence of lie detection because the Sender simply compensates by lying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093

Consensus and Disagreement : Information Aggregation under (not so) Naive Learning

Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Compte, Olivier - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

-Johnsen type aggregation rules to maximize payoffs. The DeGroot rule is chosen in equilibrium if and only if there is noiseless …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013190991