Insiders can artificially deflect the market prices of financial instruments from their full-information or inside value' by issuing deceptive accounting reports. Incentive support for disinformational activity comes through forms of compensation that allow corporate insiders to profit...

We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 218 companies accused of price fixing. These firms engage in evasive financial reporting strategies, including earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors...

This paper examines how governance and risk management affect risk-taking in banks. It distinguishes between good risks, which are risks that have an ex ante private reward for the bank on a stand-alone basis, and bad risks, which do not have such a reward. A well-governed bank takes the amount...

Introduction / William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo -- Business organization and internal governance. Revisiting American exceptionalism: democracy and the regulation of corporate governance: the case of nineteenth-century Pennsylvania in comparative context / Naomi R. Lamoreaux -- Corporate...

This paper robustly concludes that it cannot. A model is constructed under idealised conditions that presume the risks associated with artificial general intelligence (AGI) are real, that safe AGI products are possible, and that there exist socially-minded funders who are interested in funding...

We provide new evidence that debt creates shareholder value for firms that face agency costs. Our tests are unique in two respects. First, we focus on a sample of firms with potentially extreme agency problems. We study emerging market firms where the routine use of pyramid ownership structures...

Corporate-governance provisions related to takeover defenses and shareholder rights vary substantially across firms. In this paper, we use the incidence of 24 different provisions to build a 'Governance Index' for about 1,500 firms per year, and then we study the relationship between this index...

Using an extensive longitudinal data set on franchising firms, we show that established franchisors manage their portfolio of company and franchised units to maintain a particular target level of corporate control and ownership of outlets. On average, established franchisors maintain about 15...

This paper describes and considers explanations for changes in corporate governance and merger activity in the United States since 1980. Corporate governance in the 1980s was dominated by intense merger activity distinguished by the prevalence of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and hostility. After a...