Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconomic model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit instrument rules' as well as targeting rules.' The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to actual...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

Previous analysis of the implementation of inflation targeting is extended to monetary policy responses to different shocks, consequences of model uncertainty, effects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization, a comparison with nominal GDP targeting, and implications of forward-looking...

This paper is a selective survey of new or recent methods to extract information about market expectations from asset prices for monetary policy purposes. Traditionally, interest rates and forward exchange rates have been used to extract expected means of future interest rates, exchange rates...

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting: the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy. The weight on output stabilization determines how...

Price level targeting (without base drift) and inflation targeting (with base drift) are compared under commitment and discretion, with persistence in unemployment. Price level targeting is often said to imply more short-run inflation variability and thereby more employment variability than...

We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history-dependence, and achieve determinancy of equilibrium, so as to reproduce a socially optimal equilibrium. We also evaluate these variants in terms of the transparency of the...

Monetary policy can achieve average inflation equal to a given inflation target and, at best, a good compromise between inflation variability and output-gap variability. Monetary policy cannot completely stabilize either inflation or the output gap. Increased credibility in the form of inflation...

This paper proves a certainty equivalence result for optimal policy under commitment with symmetric partial information about the state of the economy in a model with forward-looking variables. This result is used in our previous paper, Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy,' which synthesizes...

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be...