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10
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9
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8
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7
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7
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ECONIS (ZBW)
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1
Contracts and Money
Jovanovic, Boyan
-
1996
re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the
contract
will write one that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a …
contract
, nominal shocks affect real consumption. Since the argument should apply in many situations, it will have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473208
Saved in:
2
On the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives for Wages
Camargo, Braz
;
Lange, Fabian
;
Pastorino, Elena
-
National Bureau of Economic Research
-
2022
Performance pay in general amounts to only a small fraction of total pay. In this paper, we show that performance pay is nevertheless important for the level and dynamics of wages over the life cycle because of the incentives it indirectly provides for human capital acquisition and because of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334409
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3
Incentive Contracts
Lazear, Edward P.
-
1986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477157
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4
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, Jerry R.
-
1982
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271
Saved in:
5
Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search
Lentz, Rasmus
-
2014
In this paper I explore optimal employment
contract
design in a random search framework, where workers search on and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458676
Saved in:
6
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, Robert
-
1991
. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation
contract
optimizes total incentives -- the combination of … the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation
contract
. Thus, the … explicit incentives from the optimal compensation
contract
should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475208
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7
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, Edward P.
-
1979
This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478746
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8
Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?
Holden, Richard T.
-
2019
Two parties sign a
contract
but before they fully perform they modify the
contract
. Should courts enforce the modified … to write a
contract
that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. But …
contract
technology, e.g., the use of liquidated damages, to ensure commitment are disfavored by courts and subject to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479782
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9
Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675)
Green, Jerry R.
-
1981
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478500
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10
Courts and Relational Contracts
Johnson, Simon
-
2001
Post-communist countries offer new evidence on the relative importance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new relationships between firms and their customers. Well-functioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470146
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