We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observablewealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask forcollateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the creditmarket and the wages offered in the labor market. Both pooling and...

We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurialtalent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurshipbecause of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside...

The 1990s were characterized by substantial financial sectorconsolidation across a large number of industrializedcountries...

Bank supervisors have long recognized two types of shortcomingsin the Basle Accord’s risk-based capital (RBC)framework. First, the regulatory measures of “capital” maynot represent a bank’s true capacity to absorb unexpectedlosses. Deficiencies in reported loan loss reserves, forexample,...