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An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Engelmann, Dirk - 1999

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582410

A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games : an experimental study

Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - 2002

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627290

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 1998

. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578001

On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 2000

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612050

Selfinformative limits of bayes estimates and generalized maximum likelihood

Bunke, Olaf (contributor); Johannes, Jan (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001919013

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426

Framing effects on asset markets : an experimental analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - 2001

In this paper we investigate four hypotheses which are inconsistent with expected utility theory, but may well be … explained by prospect theory. It deals with framing, the non-linearity of subjective probabilities, the disposition effect, and …) found little correspondence between different experimental risk elicitation methods. -- Prospect Theory ; Framing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613618

A note on the E-mail game : bounded rationality and induction

Dulleck, Uwe - 1997

In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893

How ultimatum offers emerge : a study in bounded rationality

Güth, Werner - 2000

The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaptation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583892

Robust learning experiments : evidence for learning and deliberation

Güth, Werner - 2000

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612041