Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants. -- contests ; merger

We consider chi-squared type tests for testing the hypothesis H 0 that a density f of observations X1,..., Xn lies in a parametric class of densities F. We consider a version of chi-squared type test using kernel estimates for the density. The main result is, following Liero, Läuter and Konakov...

We consider two tests for testing the hypothesis that a density lies in a parametric class of densities and compare them by means of simulation. Both considered tests are based on the integrated squared distance of the kernel density estimator from its hypothetical expectation. However,...

We give here a simulation study of a density estimator, issued from sharp adaptive estimation. This nonparametric estimator was previously proved to have interesting theoretical properties. In this paper we describe the method and apply it successfully to i.i.d. simulated data issued from...

The second–generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical...

This paper considers the introduction of stock options in an (dynamically) incomplete securities market made up of a riskless bond and the stock. The stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift. However, there is incomplete information about the unknown stochastic...

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove...

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...

This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys...