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How ultimatum offers emerge : a study in bounded rationality
Güth, Werner - 2000
The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in …. This illustrates the applicability of the general framework of boundedly rational decision emergence. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583892
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The relevance of equal splits : on a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games
Güth, Werner; Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998
The findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574884
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Framing effects on asset markets : an experimental analysis
Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - 2001
In this paper we investigate four hypotheses which are inconsistent with expected utility theory, but may well be explained by prospect theory. It deals with framing, the non-linearity of subjective probabilities, the disposition effect, and the correspondence of different experimental risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613618
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Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation : a game theoretic account
Güth, Werner - 1997
If one abstracts from specially organized markets like stock or commodity exchanges, (international) trade relies on bargaining between the interested parties. Whereas earlier the results of bargaining were seen as unpredictable or determined by an at most vaguely defined concept of (relative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661013
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Robust learning experiments : evidence for learning and deliberation
Güth, Werner - 2000
Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they … encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking …, endogenous timing in negotiations, and alternating offer bargaining allow to draw a few general conclusions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612041
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Strategies, heuristics and the relevance of risk aversion in a dynamic decision problem
Müller, Wieland - 1999
In this paper I consider a complex decision problem where subjects have to cope with a time horizon of uncertain … economic theory suggests to solve the decision problem. But since real decision makers can hardly be expected to behave …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581111
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An experimental analysis of equal punishment games
Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner - 1999
In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581099
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From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001
Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562
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A note on the E-mail game : bounded rationality and induction
Dulleck, Uwe - 1997
In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893
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Learning to like what you have : explaining the endowment effect
Huck, Steffen; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Oechssler, Joerg - 1997
The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657123