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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

two period game, involving the choke of the contract; length by the principal and an investment choke by the agent. In … contrast to the game theoretic predictions, we find that investment of the worker and length of contract; are strictly … although the model is fully deterministic. This could imply a behaviorally relevant difference between contract and market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

the terms of the contract. However, in contrast with economic predictions, we find that agents (i) reject 'unfair … contracts' and that (ii) given acceptance, their effort choices are to some extent driven by reciprocity. It seems that contract … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?

Kübler, Dorothea - 1997

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470

Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Peleg, Bezalel - 1998

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578580

Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883

Initial offerings of options

Müller, Sigrid M. - 2001

This paper considers the introduction of stock options in an (dynamically) incomplete securities market made up of a riskless bond and the stock. The stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift. However, there is incomplete information about the unknown stochastic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613613

Predictive accuracy of political stock markets : empirical evidence from a European perspective

Berlemann, Michael; Schmidt, Carsten - 2001

are quite reliable on the aggregate level we find systematic prediction errors on the contract level that can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614879

Third- and higher-price auctions

Wolfstetter, Elmar - 1995

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders’ valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630548

Canonical decomposition of linear transformations of two independent Brownian motions

Föllmer, Hans; Wu, Ching-Tang; Yor, Marc - 1998

Motivated by the Kyle-Back model of “insider trading”, we consider certain classes of linear transformations of two independent Brownian motions and study their canonical decomposition as semimartingales in their own filtration. In particular we characterize those transformations which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578007

Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research

Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010