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Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Mental accounting and the impact of tax penalty and audit frequency on the declaration of income : an experimental analysis

Maciejovsky, Boris; Kirchler, Erich; Schwarzenberger, … - 2001

dividend earnings. However in line with prospect theory, it can be shown that a purchase of assets is perceived as a subjective … ; prospect theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613619

Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight : do legal differences matter?

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Schneider, Friedrich - 2001

From an economic point of view, legal considerations apart, tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden. Due to legal differences and moral concerns it is, however, likely that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614298

Finance, investment, and firm value in Germany and the US : a comparative analysis

Nowak, Eric - 1998

Germany and the United States are generally seen as the two competing systems of corporate governance. In search for a comparative welfare analysis of the financial systems, we are interested in (i) the aggregate value-added of corporate investments in the two countries and in (ii) the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578016

Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?

Kübler, Dorothea - 1997

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470

On the regulation of social norms

Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Auctions and corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882