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The Power of a Bad Example – A Field Experiment in Household Garbage Disposal (Revision of CentER DP 2013-018)

Dur, R.; Vollaard, B.A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2013

Abstract: Field-experimental studies have shown that people litter more in more littered environments.Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly remove litter. While such policies may avoid that people follow the bad example of litterers, they may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090473

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, H.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional … equity contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is … to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395

Are moral objections to free riding evolutionarily stable?

Güth, W.; Nitzan, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092629

Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects

Reijnierse, Hans; Koster, M.A.L.; Voorneveld, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contri- butions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092905

Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweitzer's Open Club Model Semi-Public Goods

ten Raa, Thijs; Gilles, R.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy.An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents.We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090319

Married with Children : A Collective Labor Supply Model with Detailed Time Use and Intrahousehold Expenditure Information

Cherchye, L.J.H.; de Rock, B.; Vermeulen, F.M.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

We propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005). In our model, adults' individual preferences do not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods. They also depend on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090416

What's causing overreaction? : An experimental investigation of recency and the hot hand effect

Offerman, T.J.S.; Sonnemans, J.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090436

Inequality, trust and growth : An experimental study

Sadrieh, A.; Verbon, H.A.A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow.In each period, players choose to sabotage, to co-operate, or to play best response.Sabotage harms social output and growth.Mutual co-operation maximises both.The property rights...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090686

Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods

Gilles, R.P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090944

Strategic vs Non-Strategic Motivations of Sanctioning

Vyrastekova, J.; Funaki, Y.; Takeuchi, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject learns about the sanctions received in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090990