We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

How does risk or uncertainty in the productivity of research affect the growth rate of the economy? To answer this question, a model of endogenous technological change is used where sustained growth stems from intentional investments in R&D from profit-maximizing firms. The uncertainty arises...

The analysis in this paper shows that unpredictable variations in economic productivity may have a positive or negative effect on the average growth rate of output. This theoretical ambiguity result is not solely determined by the value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (of...