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Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections …. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137020

How Polarization and Political Instability affect Learning through Experimentation

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

following elections (exogenous elections) and <LI>the decision is salient and the election outcome depends on it (endogenous … elections). </OL> We show that while the possibility of learning increases activism, the existence of political instability … distorts learning. Furthermore, in contrast to the existing literature, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144519

On Committees of Experts

Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of "the public." Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504918

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016251

Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies?

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016253

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513247

On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groups and policymakers, featuring endogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamic patterns in economic policies may arise once interest group formation is taken into account. <BR><BR>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136859

Politicians' Motivation, Role of Elections, and Policy Choices

Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running … if unseated. This finding exhibits the disciplining function of elections. A striking result in our paper is that bad …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136888

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136910