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Do Auctions and Forced Divestitures increase Competition?

Soetevent, Adriaan R.; Haan, Marco A.; Heijnen, Pim - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for high- way gasoline stations and forcing the divestiture of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137121

Do Auctions select Efficient Firms?

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage. If only one license is auctioned, standard results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144557

Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition

Brandts, Jordi; Reynolds, Stanley S.; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

In the process of regulatory reform in the electric power industry, the mitigation of market power is one of the basic problems regulators have to deal with. We use experimental data to study the sources of market power with supply function competition, akin to the competition in wholesale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838542

Adoption of Superior Technology in Markets with Heterogeneous Network Externalities and Price Competition

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Mendys, Ewa - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

In this paper we investigate whether markets with heterogeneous network externalities can be locked-in by old technologies even if superior technologies are available. Heterogeneous network externalities are present when some consumers care more about the size of the market share of a good than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144403

The Impact of Uncertainty on Investment: A Meta-Analysis

Koetse, Mark J.; Groot, Henri L.F. de; Florax, Raymond … - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

In this paper we perform a meta-analysis on empirical estimates of the impact between investment and uncertainty. Since … investment research. For example, not including factor prices in investment models may seriously affect the model outco! mes … can explain to a large extent why empirical estimates of the investment-uncertainty relationship differ. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137096

Starting an R&D Project under Uncertainty

Dobbelaere, Sabien; Luttens, Roland Iwan; Peters, Bettina - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We study a two-stage R&D project with an abandonment option. Two types of uncertainty influence the decision to start R&D. Demand uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a proportional increase and decrease in demand. Technical uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a decrease and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016252

Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics

Abbring, Jaap H.; Campbell, Jeffrey R. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136887

On The Relevance Of Irrelevant Information

Parakhonyak, Alexei - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

This paper analyses the role of information in the search process. I

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531424

Risk Aversion and the Subjective Time Discount Rate: A Joint Approach

Praag, Bernard M.S. van; Booij, Adam S. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

In this paper we analyze a large sample of individual responses to six lottery questions. We

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137004

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature as composed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. The floor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented. The policy outcome is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098