We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by … efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the … communication graph the total payoff to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoff of these players when …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In … feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies. …

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which … players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted … satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …