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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227
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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987441
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961
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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
the implications of these contract imperfections for optimal organizational design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973
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The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives: An Experiment
Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016258
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Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878
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Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions
Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144477
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
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On Committees of Experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of "the public." Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504918