We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions …: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). Our results show that the leniency program does …. The results do not differ substantially across auction types although the deterrence effect of the leniency program is …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions and bidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has a …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …

implies that transaction costs as part of total costs of ownership carry a large weight in procurement decisions. An analysis …

the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience …Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …

, contractual, and legal solutions. Our results show that auctions (competition among many informed buyers) provide a solution to …

In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We … approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction …