Showing 1 - 10 of 92
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
endogenously in a way that admits a stable assignment of workers to firms. This contrasts with existing work on job matching, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016278
explanations for) positive assortative matching. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504886
auction in the world. We find that there is a substantial price decline and suggest that the presence of a buyer's option …, whereby the winner of the first auction has the opportunity to buy the remaining units at the winning price, is a main …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281959
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238
We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504927
We analyze the implications of multiple applications by job seekers for the microfoundations of the matching function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042226
This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136943
approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003388
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a generalized Rothschild and Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to the accidental probability and their expenditure levels in case an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136996