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Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Trade opportunities are generally seen as valuable instruments to improve the allocation of resources in society. However, when the traded rights are secured through unproductive rent-seeking contests, the tradeability of the rents may provide stronger incentives to invest in rent-seeking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136949

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … pattern of the feasible policies. In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimal allocation of … of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closed rule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeably reduced while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136963

On Committees of Experts

Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of "the public." Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504918

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016251

Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies?

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016253

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513247

On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groups and policymakers, featuring endogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamic patterns in economic policies may arise once interest group formation is taken into account. <BR><BR>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136859

Politicians' Motivation, Role of Elections, and Policy Choices

Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136888