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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within … on the reciprocity of employees. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473
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Other-regarding Preferences, Group Identity and Political Participation: An Experiment
Robalo, Pedro; Schram, Arthur; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We experimentally study the relationship between other-regarding preferences, group identity and political participation. In doing so, we propose a novel group identity induction procedure that succeeds in creating environments where in-group bias is either high or low. At the individual level,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256817
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Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255564
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Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships
Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256342
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Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions
Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257489
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The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, C. Mirjam van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255986
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Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study
Vyrastekova, Jana; Onderstal, Sander; Koning, Pierre - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, workers who chose … how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the … performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256659
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Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60.<P> Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255890
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Rent-seeking versus Productive Activities in a Multi-task Experiment
Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
have to strike a balance between the productive incentives and the rent-seeking incentives they provide. Standard theory … recent theories that emphasize the importance of reciprocity, however, suggest that this relationship may go the other way … around. In this paper we test these predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. By and large our findings confirm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256678
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032