Showing 1 - 10 of 107
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421
Trade opportunities are generally seen as valuable instruments to improve the allocation of resources in society. However, when the traded rights are secured through unproductive rent-seeking contests, the tradeability of the rents may provide stronger incentives to invest in rent-seeking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255926
This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>International Game Theory Review</I> (2008), 10, 257-278.<P> This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257198
In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions on the payoff function f and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probability measures instead of the set of mixed strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256240
This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001380">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>.<p>Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints....</p></a>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256518
We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection tomacroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level ispresent. These models often exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria,and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with ameasure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256562
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256599
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'SIAM Journal on Optimization', 2007, 18, 290-308. <P> In this paper we present two general results on the existence of a discrete zero point of a function from the n-dimensional integer lattice Zn to the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn. Under...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256600
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256700
While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256730