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Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

Trade opportunities are generally seen as valuable instruments to improve the allocation of resources in society. However, when the traded rights are secured through unproductive rent-seeking contests, the tradeability of the rents may provide stronger incentives to invest in rent-seeking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255926

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political … as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257116

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256988

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256524

Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?

Dur, Robert A.J.; Roelfsema, Hein J. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision.If all of the costs of public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256583

Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256630

The Optimal Degree of Polarization

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Journal of Political Economics', 2004, 20, 255-262.<P> In the literature on electoral politics full convergence of policy platforms is usually regarded as socially optimal. Thereason is that risk-averse voters prefer a sure...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256641

The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for Herd Behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256752

Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians

Beniers, Klaas J. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parliament who votes against the leader's policy. A competent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256813