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A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Rani - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572839
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Money Pumps in the Market
Rubinstein, Ariel; Spiegler, Rani - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828043
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Speculative Contracts
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Rani - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708311
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The Market for Quacks
Spiegler, Rani - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708444
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Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness
Heller, Dana; Spiegler, Ran - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572877
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Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations
Spiegler, Ran - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708572
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Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359171