Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...

In this article, the author inverses the traditional approach (does corporate governance favour innovation?) considering how innovation influences corporate governance in the European telecommunication sector.

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital-backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements—namely, put and call options, tag-along and drag-along rights, demand and...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure...