The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are...

We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex...

Cet article s’intéresse à la structure du capital et aux clauses de protection insérées dans les contrats d’émission de la dette. La théorie des options permet d’apprécier la structure du capital , les fonds propres et la dette dans un contexte standard à la Black et Scholes (1973)...

This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their...

The recommendations of Basel II impose to banks the use of the "hard" information in the decision making process of SMEs loans. These banks must choose between replacing the "soft" information, already used, by the "hard" information and combining the two forms of information. This thesis...

Central Banker’s Behaviour in an Uncertain EnvironmentSeveral recent papers are devoted to the examination of the central banker’s behaviour in an uncertain economic environment. This paper proposes, from a central banker’s point of view, a synthesis of the main sources of uncertainty as...