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ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH GENERALTECHNOLOGIES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; …

We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectlydiscriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rentdissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a productionfunction with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868959

DISSIPATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS WITHENTRY COSTS

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2002

This paper considers the extent to which expenditure by contestants inimperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contests dissipates all or only partof the rent. In particular, we investigate strategic effects, technologicaleffects and asymmetry under an assumption of diminishing returns to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868938

Commitment in Symmetric Contests

Possajennikov, Alex - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2008

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contestswith concave success function, commitment to a particular strategydoes not increase a player's payo, while in contests with more thantwo players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game inwhich commitment does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868568

LOSS AVERSION AND THE TULLOCK PARADOX

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2003

will significantlyreduce the proportion of the rent dissipated in the form of resourcesused up in the competition for that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868814

Environmental Protection and Free Trade: IndirectCompetition for Political Inuence

Zhihao Yu - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 1999

This paper shows that although small or nancially constrained environmentalistgroups may be in a weak position, relative to polluting industries, in the directcompetition for political inuence, they can compete indirectly through changingpublic preferences over environmental quality. However, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869307

Why Praise Inequality? Public Good Provision, IncomeDistribution and Social Welfare

Dasgupta, Indraneel - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2008

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identicalindividual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric andconcave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868577

FINANCIAL PREDATION BY THE WEAK

Bougheas, Spiros; Saksit Thananittayaudom - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868761

BERTRAND AND COURNOT COMPETITIONS IN ADYNAMIC GAME

Mukherjee, Arijit - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under … Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on the probability ofsuccess in R&D but does not depend on the degree … of product differentiation. While‘static’ welfare is higher under Bertrand competition, we find that ‘dynamic’ welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868906

WELFARE EFFECTS OF ENTRY: THE IMPACT OFLICENSING

Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Soma - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

competition policy... …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868907

DISGUISED AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2001

Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868958