We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning...

This paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighborhoods where players do not optimize but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing...

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

This paper proposes a new explanation for the smile and skewness effects in implied volatilities. Starting from a microeconomic equilibrium approach, we develop a diffusion model for stock prices explicitly incorporating the technical demand induced by hedging strategies. This leads to a...

Let X be a seminmartingale and Teta the space of all predictable X-integrable processes teta such that integral tetat dX is inthe space S square of semimartingales. We consider the problem of approximating a given random variable H element of L square (P) by the sum of a constant c and a...

We study the problem of convergence of discrete-time option values to continuous-time option values. While previous papers typically concentrate on the approximation of geometric Brownian motion by a binomial tree, we consider here the case where the model is incomplete in both continuos and...