Showing 1 - 10 of 42
One purpose of electricity restructuring is to create a market in which prices reflect costs to which both generators and consumers may respond efficiently. Yet in many jurisdictions, spot prices may be quite volatile, and both consumers and generators of electricity have made it clear that they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827244
The 1994 Riegle Neal (RN) Act removed interstate banking restrictions in the US. The primary motivation was to permit geographic risk diversification (GRD). Using a factor model to measure banks' geographic risk, we show that RN expanded GRD possibilities in small states, but that few banks took...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850122
This paper considers the design of individual quota programs for fisheries where more than one market class of fish is harvested and where a manager is uncertain about the fishing technology, prices, stock levels, and compliance. In particular, the paper considers three problems that follow from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704709
This paper considers the choice among three different types of individual quota programs in a multi-product fishery when technology, prices, and compliance are all uncertain: (1) Aggregated quota, which regulates the total weight of all species; (2) Disaggregated quota, which regulates the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704832
Restructuring is causing fundamental changes in the market for electricity across North America including changes in the framework for decisions about investment in generation capacity. In a restructured market the generator is no longer guaranteed a reasonable rate of return on assets; instead...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704836
We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and <93>lemons.<94> Exchange is modelled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes....</94></93>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827223
A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have correlated private information about their valuations. In contrast to the monopoly case where sellers charge entry fees and extract all buyers surplus, it is shown that in the \emph{unique}...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827266
In this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827273
In frictional matching markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, sellers incur discrete showing costs to show goods to buyers who incur discrete inspection costs to assess the suitability of the goods on offer. This paper studies how brokers can help reduce these costs by managing the level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922987
A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Alternatives are described by several distinct attributes. Each committee member privately assesses the quality of one attribute (her \
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695009