This paper analyzes a game of trade policy (called Bilateralism) between three countries in which each country chooses whether to liberalize trade preferentially in the form of a Customs Union (CU), multilaterally, or not at all. We also analyze a restricted version of this game (called...

This paper examines trends in innovative activity in several major Asian countries during 1997-2011 as measured by their filings and grants of various types of intellectual property (IP). By almost all measures, there has been a remarkable increase in innovative activity in China. In fact, in...

This paper examines trends in innovative activity in several major Asian countries during 1997-2011 as measured by their filings and grants of various types of intellectual property (IP). By almost all measures, there has been a remarkable increase in innovative activity in China. In fact, in...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

In US-COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measure imposing country of origin labelling (COOL) requirements on livestock of domestic, foreign, and mixed origin was in violation of the obligation to avoid discrimination embedded in Art. 2.1 of the...

This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of regional exhaustion of intellectual property, a policy regime under which a set of countries permit parallel imports from one another but not from the rest of the world. A three-country model is developed in which two high-income countries...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the...

Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we develop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compulsory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product. The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to...

This paper analyzes economic linkages between the exhaustion and protection of intellectual property. We consider a North-South model, where a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North by virtue of an intellectual property right (IPR) -- such as a patent or a trademark -- has the incentive...