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The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens' preferences for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622243
terms of willingness to pay. This framework is more in line with standard public choice theory as individuals are forced to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111085
In this paper, we elicit preferences of Swiss citizens for the allocation of income redistribution to different uses through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008. Neustadt and Zweifel (2009} provide an estimate of the total desired amount of income redistribution as a share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644924
Detroit automakers have opposed mandated improvements in fuel economy since legislation was first proposed in the 1970’s. Their opposition is based, among other considerations, on the assumption that their customers value fuel economy only when fuel prices are high. This paper presents the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790026
Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835685
I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109699
The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565133
We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739656