We compare the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the time-varying hazard model developed by Shumway (2001) and the one-period probit model used by Cole and Gunther (1998). Using data on U.S. bank failures from 1985 – 1992, we find that, from an econometric perspective, the hazard model is...

In this study, we analyze why U.S. commercial banks failed during the recent financial crisis. We find that proxies for commercial real estate investments, as well as traditional proxies for the CAMELS components, do an excellent job in explaining the failures of banks that were closed during...

The United States economy has suffered over the past four years from crises in mortgage foreclosures and in financial markets, as well as a long recession that some have referred to as the Great Recession. The links between these events, or more broadly the causes, extent and effects of these...

This article examines the role of commercial real estate investments in the banking crisis of 1985-92, an unprecedented period during which more than 1,300 banks failed. Bank failures are fundamentally important because of the unique role played by financial institutions in the provision of...

How quickly do the CAMEL ratings regulators assign to banks during on-site examinations become "stale"? One measure of the information content of CAMEL ratings is their ability to discriminate between banks that will fail and those that will survive. To assess the accuracy of CAMEL ratings in...

The ability to predict bank failure has become much more important since the mortgage foreclosure crisis began in 2007. The model proposed in this study uses proxies for the regulatory standards embodied in the so-called CAMELS rating system, as well as several local or national economic...

This paper empirically investigates the causes of bank failures in Japan and Indonesia. Using logistic regression analysis of financial ratios, we explore the usefulness of domestic bank failure prediction models with a cross-country model that allows for cross-correlation of the error terms....

We model and predict that politicians have incentives to delay bank failure in election years and that this incentive is exacerbated if the election is close. Our empirical application using the US data supports these predictions. At the bank level, we show that bank failure in an election year...

In recent decades many countries have experienced banking crisis, for example Mexico (1994-1995), East Asian countries (after 1997) and transition economies (in 1990´s). The Czech Republic can not be omitted. The aim of this article is to characterise the role of early warning signals in...