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Challenges in implementation of the maternity leave in Kosovo

Ramosaj, Argjiro - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

the success story of Albania and other countries in the region are taken into consideration; Strengthening monitoring …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107701

Optimal organization of surrogacy contracts and underinvestment

Pramanick, Amrita; Banerjee, Swapnendu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We develop a model of commercial gestational surrogacy in which a childless couple approaches a prospective surrogate, who is willing to gestate for the couple. The surrogate’s care is non-contractible. We show that if the surrogate doesn’t have any wealth, at the optimum, she is always...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109840

Venture capital performance: the disparity between Europe and the United States

Hege, Ulrich; Palomino, Frederic; Schwienbacher, Armin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This paper compares the success of venture capital investments in the United States and in Europe by analyzing individual venture-backed companies and the value generated within the stage financing process. We document that US venture capitalists generate significantly more value with their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111708

Further Examination of Potential Discrimination Among MLB Umpires

Tainsky, Scott; Mills, Brian; Winfree, Jason A. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

of econometric specifications to test the robustness of the results, adding the role of implicit and explicit monitoring …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113724

Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal may be Useless

Yim, Andrew - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2000

Although Holmstrom’s informativeness criterion provides a theoretical foundation for the controllability principle and interfirm relative performance evaluation, empirical and field studies provide only weak evidence on such practices. This paper refines the traditional informativeness...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784967

A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the colla...

Ojo, Marianne - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008805896

Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation

Rei, Claudia - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835364

Cartel Duration and Endogenous Private Monitoring and Communication: An Instrumental Variables Approach

Zhou, Jun - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practicesâ€” known as the â€œlysine strategy profile (LSP)â€â€” on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401303

The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure

Schouten, Michael C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

The use of equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares (“hidden ownership”) is increasingly drawing attention from the financial community, as is the exercise of voting power without corresponding economic interest (“empty voting”). Market participants and commentators...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000662

Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing

Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives … for verification. Auditing exacerbates this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than monitoring … choose between two equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Under auditing the principal receives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785918