We offer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies individual demands globally. Moreover, under observation of only a subset of the equilibrium manifold, we find domains on which aggregate and individual demands are identifiable. Our argument avoids the...

The issue of how players' model of a game may evolves over time is largely unexplored. We formalize this issue for games with perfect information, and show that small-probability model deterioration may upset the complete-model backward induction solution, possibly yielding a Pareto-improving...

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of common agency games with direct externalities between principals when they compete with nonlinear prices. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal directly affects the other principal's payoff. First, we...

We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to...

This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996)...

This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996)...

We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to...