This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union must decide, in each period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union...

We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. Level-k reasoning is appealing due to the natural...

This paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem. Two players have to play one of two possible coordination games. Only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played. It is shown that even if a large...

The authors study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her...

This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This paper explicitly adds a time...